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NOTE
The Quest for Equal Dignity: Federal
Statutory Protection Against Sexual
Orientation Discrimination
Walsh v. Friendship Village of South County, 352 F. Supp. 3d 920 (E.D. Mo.
2019).
Alec D. Guy*

I. INTRODUCTION
Over one million Americans are married to someone of the same sex.1
Although the United States Supreme Court guaranteed the fundamental right
of marriage to same-sex couples in 2015,2 these individuals can still be denied
housing or fired from their dream job after getting legally married.3 For much
of history, gay individuals have not been protected by the law, both statutorily
and constitutionally. Private individuals are generally still free to discriminate
against gay people today because federal statutes rarely prohibit discrimination
based on sexual orientation. Consequently, many have argued that sexual orientation discrimination constitutes unlawful discrimination based on sex. Until

* B.S. Political Science and Economics, Missouri Western State University, 2017; J.D.

Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2020. I would like to thank Professor
Alexander for her insight and guidance during the writing of this Note, as well as the
Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process.
1. Adam P. Romero, Estimates of Marriages of Same-Sex Couples at the TwoYear Anniversary of Obergefell v. Hodges, THE WILLIAMS INST. (June 2017),
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Obergefell-2-Year-Marriages.pdf [perma.cc/GW8R-6FLX].
2. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
3. See Walsh v. Friendship Vill. of South Cty., 352 F. Supp. 3d 920, 925 (E.D.
Mo. 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-1395 (8th Cir. Feb. 27, 2019); Zarda v. Altitude
Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc).
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recently, these arguments were summarily dismissed, as nearly all federal circuit courts held sexual orientation is not a protected class.4 Some courts, however, have revisited precedent and held that discrimination based on sexual orientation constitutes unlawful sex discrimination.5
In Walsh v. Friendship Village, the plaintiffs, a same-sex couple, sued a
senior living community under the Fair Housing Act (the “FHA”), alleging discrimination based on sex.6 The district court, bound by Eighth Circuit precedent, denied the claim.7 This Note, in addition to explaining the Walsh decision, discusses Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the FHA, and federal case law
that bears on whether sexual orientation discrimination is a subset of unlawful
sex discrimination. This Note ultimately argues that sexual orientation discrimination constitutes unlawful sex discrimination based on Supreme Court
precedent and a plain language analysis of Title VII and the FHA.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2009, Mary Walsh and Beverly Nance were legally married in Massachusetts after being in a committed relationship for nearly forty years.8 At the
beginning of the present lawsuit, Walsh was seventy-two years old and Nance
was sixty-eight years old.9 In 2016, with hopes of moving to senior housing,
Walsh and Nance began researching Friendship Village, a senior living community that opened in 1978.10 Walsh and Nance visited the facility and spoke
with residents as well as staff, including the Residence Director, Carmen
Fronczack.11 In July of 2016, Walsh and Nance paid a $2000 deposit and
signed up for a waiting list to live at Friendship Village.12
A few months later, Fronczack asked Walsh about her relationship with
Nance, and Walsh explained that she and Nance were married.13 The next day,

4. See, e.g., Blum v. Golf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989); Wrightson v. Pizza
Hut of America, Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996); Fredette v. BVP Mgmt. Assocs., 112
F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252,
259 (1st Cir. 1999); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005),
overruled by Zarda, 883 F.3d at 100; Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131,
1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms., Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 292 (3d Cir.
2009); Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 470 (6th Cir. 2012); Hively v.
Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
5. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 341.
6. Walsh, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 924; Zarda, 883 F.3d at 108.
7. Walsh, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 926, 928.
8. Id. at 922.
9. Id. at 923.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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Fronczack informed Walsh that, due to Friendship Village’s Cohabitation Policy (the “Policy”), Walsh and Nance could not share a single unit.14 Additionally, Walsh later received a letter that recited the Policy and reiterated this decision.15 The Policy stated that Friendship Village operates in accordance with
biblical principles, as well as religious standards, and cohabitation is permitted
only if the two individuals are spouses by marriage, parent and child, or siblings.16 The term marriage was defined as “the union of one man and one
woman.”17 The Policy had been applied for many years and continued to apply
to new residents.18
In October 2016, Walsh and Nance filed a complaint alleging unlawful
sex discrimination with the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”).19 HUD referred the complaint to the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (“MCHR”), but, around a month later, MCHR voluntarily sent the complaint back to HUD.20 HUD then investigated from December 2016 to June 2018.21
In July 2018, Walsh and Nance elected to pursue their claim in federal
court.22 They first alleged sex discrimination under both the FHA and the Missouri Human Rights Act, but the latter claim was removed in an amended complaint.23 Walsh and Nance advanced three arguments: (1) they were treated
less favorably due to their sex; (2) they were treated less favorably due to their
association with another person of a particular sex; and (3) they were treated
less favorably because they did not conform to various, traditional sex stereotypes.24 The alleged stereotypes included “that a married woman should be in
a different-sex relationship; that a married woman’s spouse should be a man;
and that women should be attracted to and form relationships with men, not
women.”25
Friendship Village filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, contending that the complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. (“It is the policy of Friendship Village Sunset Hills, consistent with its long-

standing practice of operating its facilities in accordance with biblical principles and
sincerely-held religious standards, that it will permit the cohabitation of residents
within a single unit only if those residents, while residing in said unit, are related as
spouses by marriage, as parent and child or as siblings.”).
17. Id. (“The term ‘marriage’ as used in this policy means the union of one man
and one woman, as marriage is understood in the Bible. . . .”).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 923–24.
21. Id. at 924.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 925.
25. Id. at 924.
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granted.26 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
granted Friendship Village’s motion.27 The court held that the sex discrimination claim and gender stereotyping claims were truly based on sexual orientation, which is an unprotected class.28 Further, the court denied the second
claim, associational discrimination, because Walsh and Nance did not show
such claims were actionable for statutorily unprotected classes.29

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Under Title VII and the FHA, sexual orientation is not explicitly covered
as a protected class. First, this Part details the history of federal antidiscrimination statutes, such as Title VII and the FHA. Next, this Part turns to federal
case law, which continues to evolve. Early decisions dismissed the idea that
unlawful sex discrimination encompasses discrimination based on sexual orientation with very little discussion. Intermediate decisions were more sympathetic but continued to deny protection. While some circuit courts continue to
follow precedent, others have determined that discrimination based on sexual
orientation is impermissible under federal statutes.

A. Federal Statutes
Over fifty years ago, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the “1964 Act”) was
signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson after five amendments and over 500
hours of debate in Congress.30 The 1964 Act prohibits discrimination in many
types of conduct, including public accommodations, governmental services,
and education.31 Title VII of the 1964 Act, which applies to private employers,
labor unions, and employment agencies, forbids employment discrimination
based on race, sex, color, religion, and national origin.32 For example, Title
VII provides that it is unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.”33 Further, the 1964 Act created the Equal Employment Opportunity

Id.
Id. at 928.
Id. at 925–27.
Id. at 927.
1964, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (last visited Oct. 2, 2019),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/milestones/1964.html
[perma.cc/V4GCS2GT].
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018).
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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Commission (the “EEOC”) to assist in eliminating unlawful employment discrimination.34
The Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the “1968 Act”), a supplement to the 1964
Act, was signed into law on April 11, 1968.35 Title VIII of the 1968 Act, which
addresses discrimination in housing, is known as the Fair Housing Act of
1968.36 Within a year of the law’s enaction, HUD wrote a Title VIII Field
Operations Handbook and created a formalized complaint process.37 The FHA
“protects people from discrimination when they are renting or buying a home,
getting a mortgage, seeking housing assistance, or engaging in other housingrelated activities.”38 The FHA prohibits discrimination based on race, color,
national origin, religion, sex, familial status, and disability.39
Specifically, the FHA makes it illegal to “refuse to sell or rent after the
making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of,
or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin” in most circumstances.40 Additionally, the FHA prohibits the creation and publication of “any
notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention
to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.”41 Various other
practices are forbidden by the FHA as well.42 Sexual orientation, however, is
not explicitly protected by this statute.
While Title VII and the FHA are distinct, the laws are similar. Both statutes use identical language in forbidding discrimination “because of” an individual’s sex.43 The statutes were passed within five years of each other, and
the 1968 Act is intended to supplement the 1964 Act.44 Finally, courts have
determined decisions under Title VII can apply with equal force to the FHA.45

34. 1964, supra note 30.
35. History of Fair Housing, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV. (last vis-

ited
Oct.
2,
2019),
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/aboutfheo/history [perma.cc/LZG9-5Y8B].
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Housing Discrimination Under the Fair Housing Act, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING
AND URBAN DEV. (last visited Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/fair_housing_act_overview [perma.cc/7KP9-EASE].
39. Id.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2018).
41. § 3604(c).
42. See § 3604(b), (d).
43. § 3604(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018).
44. History of Fair Housing, supra note 35; 1964, supra note 30.
45. Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, 901 F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir.
2018), cert. dismissed 139 S.Ct. 1249 (2019) (mem).
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B. Early Decisions
Even though federal statutes often do not explicitly list sexual orientation
as a protected class, individuals have argued discrimination based on sexual
orientation is a form of sex discrimination, and, as such, is unlawful. Until
recently, federal circuit courts have dismissed this argument and held that discrimination based on sexual orientation is not prohibited.
In Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit opined on whether sexual orientation is protected by Title VII.46 There, plaintiff Williamson contended his supervisor
falsely accused him of interrupting workflow by discussing the details of his
gay lifestyle and of harassing another employee.47 Williamson argued he was
discriminated against based on his race because white employees engaging in
similar behavior were not punished.48 The trial court granted summary judgment for A.G. Edwards & Sons and determined Williamson believed he was
treated differently due to his sexual orientation, not his race.49 The Eighth Circuit affirmed, summarily stating that “Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals.”50
Most other circuits have adopted a similar rule.51 Before revisiting this
issue, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined
that Title VII, in prohibiting discrimination based on sex, implied that “it is
unlawful to discriminate against women because they are women and against
men because they are men.”52 The court further stated that, based on the lack
of legislative history regarding, and the circumstances surrounding, the sex
amendment, Congress clearly “never considered nor intended that this [] legislation apply to anything other than the traditional concept of sex.”53 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that “[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII . . . .”54 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded “Title VII’s prohibition of ‘sex’ discrimination applies only to discrimination on the basis of gender and should

Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir.1979),
abrogated by Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001)).
51. See supra note 4 (noting the approaches of other circuits).
52. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
53. Id.
54. Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979).
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
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not be judicially extended to include sexual preference such as homosexuality.”55 While these decisions quickly dismissed the contention that sexual orientation is a protected characteristic, more recent decisions have been more
sympathetic.

C. Intermediate Decisions
In intermediate rulings, courts continued to determine that discrimination
based on sexual orientation was not unlawful, but the decisions were more supportive of plaintiffs and, in some cases, suggested alternative claims that might
succeed.
In a 1999 decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
considered whether harassment based on sexual orientation was sufficient to
sustain a hostile work environment claim.56 The court ultimately determined
that Title VII did not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.57 The
First Circuit, however, condemned harassment based on sexual orientation,
stating that “it is a noxious practice, deserving of censure and opprobrium.”58
Yet, this was a matter of statutory construction, not moral judgment, so protection was not extended.59 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, when considering a Title VII claim alleging harassment based on sexual orientation, expressed a similar sentiment in 2000.60 The court held that
Title VII does not proscribe discrimination based on sexual orientation but
noted that the alleged conduct was “morally reprehensible whenever and in
whatever context it occurs, particularly in the modern workplace.”61
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co., explained that Title VII does not prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation.62 The court further mentioned that
Congress has repeatedly rejected attempts to extend Title VII’s protection to
sexual orientation.63 Yet, the court noted that “[h]arassment on the basis of
sexual orientation has no place in our society.”64 Additionally, the Third Cir-

55. DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated by Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
56. Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 256 (1st Cir. 1999).
57. Id. at 259.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2000), overruled by Zarda
v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 116 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc).
61. Id. at 35.
62. Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir.
2001) (citing Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 265 (citing Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35).
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cuit suggested some alternative methods to prove that sexual orientation discrimination constitutes unlawful sex discrimination.65 For example, an individual could show that “the harasser was motivated by sexual desire, the harasser was expressing a general hostility to the presence of one sex in the workplace, or the harasser was acting to punish the victim’s noncompliance with
gender stereotypes.”66 The court also expressed that there may be other ways
to show discrimination based on sexual orientation occurred because of sex.67
While these decisions still denied protection, they provided a basis for the continued evolution of the law.

D. Recent Decisions
In revisiting whether discrimination based on sexual orientation constitutes unlawful sex discrimination, some courts continue to follow precedent.
Others, though, have found sexual orientation is protected, leading to a circuit
split.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed a
Title VII claim based on sexual orientation discrimination in Evans v. Georgia
Regional Hospital.68 In that case, the plaintiff worked as a security officer at
Georgia Regional Hospital.69 As an employee of the hospital, Evans did not
receive equal work or pay.70 Further, Evans was “physically assaulted or battered,” harassed, and targeted for termination because she failed to “carry herself in a ‘traditional woman[ly] manner.’”71 Evans alleged that the discrimination occurred because of her sexual orientation, as well as her gender non-conformity, and that she was retaliated against when she filed a complaint with the
human resources department.72 The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice.73 The Eleventh Circuit determined Evans did not have a valid sexual
orientation discrimination claim in light of the circuit’s prior precedent, which
stated that “[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII . . . .”74
Id. at 264.
Id.
Id.
Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 2017), cert.
denied, 138 S.Ct. 557 (2017). In Bostock v. Clayton County Board of Commissioners,
a case currently on appeal to the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit relied on Evans
while affirming the trial court’s dismissal of a Title VII claim based on sexual orientation discrimination. 723 F. App’x 964, 965 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. granted sub nom.
Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019).
69. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1251.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1250.
73. Id. at 1253.
74. Id. at 1255 (quoting Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir.
1979)).
65.
66.
67.
68.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss4/10

8

Guy: The Quest for Equal Dignity: Federal Statutory Protection Against

2019]

SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION

1119

The court followed this decision, as precedent can only be overturned by a clear
ruling of the United States Supreme Court or by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en
banc.75
In 2017, the Seventh Circuit revisited this issue in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana.76 Hively was an openly lesbian adjunct professor
teaching at Ivy Tech’s South Bend Campus.77 The school denied Hively’s applications for a full-time position and did not renew her part-time contract.78
Hively, alleging that she was discriminated against based on her sexual orientation, obtained a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC79 and filed a claim in federal court.80 Ivy Tech filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that sexual orientation
was not a protected class.81 The trial court granted the motion, and Hively
appealed.82
Previous Seventh Circuit precedent held that “Congress had nothing more
than the traditional notion of ‘sex’ in mind when it voted to outlaw sex discrimination.”83 The court mentioned that even though the Supreme Court has not
directly addressed this issue, many recent opinions are relevant to the question
at hand.84 For example, the Supreme Court has held that gender stereotyping
constitutes sex discrimination,85 determined that harassment by a member of
the same sex can be sex discrimination,86 and recognized that same-sex marriage is constitutionally protected.87 In Hively, the Seventh Circuit noted that
deciding whether discrimination based on sexual orientation constitutes unlawful sex discrimination “is a pure question of statutory interpretation and thus
well within the judiciary’s competence.”88

75. Id. (quoting Offshore of the Palm Beaches, Inc. v. Lynch, 741 F.3d 1251, 1256
(11th Cir. 2014)).
76. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 343 (7th Cir. 2017) (en
banc).
77. Id. at 341.
78. Id.
79. Before employees or job applicants can file a lawsuit alleging discrimination
in violation of federal law, they must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and
obtain a Notice of Right to Sue. Filing a Lawsuit, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM.
(last visited Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm
[perma.cc/2LTP-XH23]. However, the are some exceptions to this general rule, such
as age discrimination or equal pay lawsuits. Id.
80. Hively, 853 F.3d at 341.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (quoting Doe v. Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 572 (7th Cir. 1997)), cert.
granted, judgment vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
84. Id. at 342.
85. Id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
86. Id. (citing Onacle v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 573 U.S. 75 (1998)).
87. Id. (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015)).
88. Id. at 343.
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The court explained that there are many approaches to statutory interpretation, such as focusing on the language of the statute, delving into legislative
history, examining subsequent actions of the legislature, or some combination
of these methods.89 Of course, if the statute is clear, there is no need to examine
legislative history or other sources, even if the language is not perfectly
straightforward.90 The court acknowledged that this method is more controversial when the language embodies unintended consequences.91 In these circumstances, some courts suggest turning to legislative history.92 The failure to
include a protected class or amend a statute, however, could be the result of
many factors.93 Congress might be pleased with the statute or perhaps legislative gridlock is due to logrolling rather than the merits of the legislation.94
The court used multiple methods to determine that discrimination based
on sexual orientation is a subset of sex discrimination.95 First, the court utilized
the comparative method, which asks if the plaintiff would have been treated
the same way had his or her sex been different.96 The true question, the Seventh
Circuit noted, is whether the plaintiff’s protected characteristic played a role in
the discrimination.97 Consequently, other variables, such as the sex of the
plaintiff’s partner, should remain constant.98 Using this analysis, the court determined that Hively was disadvantaged because she was a woman, as Ivy Tech
did not have an anti-marriage policy that extended to heterosexual couples.99
Further, Hively was treated differently because she did not conform to gender
stereotypes, namely being heterosexual.100 The court explained that a “policy
that discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation does not affect every
woman, or every man, but it is based on assumptions about the proper behavior
for someone of a given sex.”101 The court ultimately determined that the discrimination would not have occurred if Hively’s sex was not considered.102
Next, the court applied an association theory.103 Courts have recognized
that individuals who are treated differently based on the protected characteristic
of a person with whom they associate are disadvantaged due to their own

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 343–44.
Id. at 345.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 345–46.
Id. at 346.
Id.
Id. at 346–47.
Id. at 347.
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traits.104 The Supreme Court first recognized this type of discrimination in
Loving v. Virginia.105 There, the Supreme Court “held that ‘restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.’”106 Essentially, both parties to the interracial marriage were denied important rights solely because of their race.107
Courts have applied this rationale to Title VII’s proscription on race discrimination.108 The Hively court explained that the same analysis applies to discrimination based on sex, as the statute’s text draws no distinction between the protected categories listed.109 The Seventh Circuit reserved additional complications, such as religious concerns, for future consideration.110
According to Judge Diane S. Sykes’s dissenting opinion, statutes should
be interpreted by giving words their “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”111 Consequently, the dissent argued, the statute should be interpreted
considering the common meaning of sex in 1964. Judge Sykes argued that in
1964, sex meant biologically male or female.112 Additionally, to a fluent
speaker of English, sex does not encompass sexual orientation, and the terms
are not used interchangeably.113 In support of this contention, Judge Sykes
referenced various statutes that protect both sex and sexual orientation.114
Therefore, she concluded that sexual orientation should be considered a separate category of discrimination, not a subset of sex discrimination.115 The dissent further argued that the majority used the comparative test incorrectly because its analysis changed not only Hively’s sex but also Hively’s sexual orientation.116 Judge Sykes argued the proper test must be whether the employer
treats gay men the same as lesbians.117
The dissent also determined that sex stereotyping is not implicated by
sexual orientation discrimination, as heterosexuality is not a sex-specific stereotype.118 An employer does not insist that employees match a stereotype specific to their sex but instead that they match the conventional sexual orientation,
regardless of whether they are male or female.119 The dissent then argued the
Id.
Id. (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 383 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
Id. (citing Loving, 383 U.S. at 12).
Id. at 347.
Id. at 347–48.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 352.
Id. at 362 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (quoting Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 571
U.S. 220, 227 (2014)).
112. Id. (Sykes, J., dissenting).
113. Id. (Sykes, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 363–64 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 364–65 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 366 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Sykes, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 370 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
119. Id. (Sykes, J., dissenting).
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
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majority’s reliance on Loving was misplaced.120 Judge Sykes determined that
Loving rested on the conclusion that miscegenation laws are inherently racist
because those laws used racial classifications to promote white supremacy.121
However, Judge Sykes differentiated sexual orientation discrimination as not
inherently sexist because it does not aim to promote the supremacy of one
sex.122 The dissent believed that Congress, rather than the courts, should provide a remedy for discrimination based on sexual orientation.123
The Second Circuit, in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., concluded that
sexual orientation discrimination is, in part, motivated by sex.124 As a result,
discrimination based on sexual orientation is a subset of sex discrimination.125
In Zarda, the plaintiff was a skydiving instructor.126 Given the nature of the
work, which often involved close physical proximity, instructors frequently
joked with customers in an effort to make them feel more comfortable.127 In
June 2010, Zarda told a female client “he was gay ‘and ha[d] an ex-husband to
prove it.’”128 He said this was an attempt to preempt potential discomfort, but
the client alleged Zarda inappropriately touched her and used his sexual orientation as an excuse.129 The incident was reported to Zarda’s boss, and he was
quickly fired.130 Zarda denied participating in any inappropriate behavior and
insisted he was dismissed due to his sexual orientation.131
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant regarding
Zarda’s sex stereotyping claim, as the Second Circuit previously held gender
stereotyping claims cannot be based on sexual orientation.132 Initially, a panel
of Second Circuit judges declined Zarda’s invitation to reconsider the court’s
prior rulings because precedent can only be changed by the court sitting en
banc.133 After the panel decision, the Second Circuit granted en banc review.134
In Zarda, the Second Circuit addressed the contention that an employee
can be fired for sexual orientation without reference to sex.135 For example, an
employer, when communicating the reason why a male employee was fired,
would state “I fired him because he is gay” not “I fired him because he was a

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 367 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 368 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
Id. (Sykes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 372 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc).
Id.
Id. at 108.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 109.
Id.
Id. at 110.
Id.
Id. at 113.
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man.”136 However, the court noted that even if an employer does not reference
sex, the employee is still a man that is attracted to men. 137 As such, “firing a
man because he is attracted to men is a decision motivated, at least in part, by
sex.”138
The Second Circuit further addressed the argument that an individual in
1964, when Title VII was first passed, would never believe that discrimination
based on sex also prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation.139 The
court explained that, if this were true, the same could be said for other forms
of discrimination prohibited by Title VII.140 For example, sexual harassment
and hostile work environment claims were not originally covered by Title
VII.141 Congress simply could not include all types of discrimination against
protected classes, so courts are responsible for “giv[ing] effect to the broad
language that Congress used.”142 As the Supreme Court has said, statutory
provisions often go beyond the primary evil to cover reasonably similar
evils.143 Finally, the Second Circuit explained that the text, rather than the main
concerns of the legislature, is the lodestar of statutory interpretation.144
The court found that the test for determining whether sex discrimination
occurred reaffirms the result.145 Courts determine whether a basis for discrimination is a function of sex by ascertaining whether the treatment would have
been different but for the person’s sex.146 In applying this test to sexual orientation, the court looked at the facts of Hively.147 Under those circumstances, if
Hively were a man attracted to women, she would not have been denied a promotion.148 Therefore, Hively would not have been discriminated against but
for her sex.149 The Second Circuit then turned to the government’s contention
that the true comparison should be between a gay man and a lesbian.150 The
court, however, rejected this argument and explained that for the comparative

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 114.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 115 (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 276 (1982)).
Id. (quoting Onacle v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 53 U.S. 75, 79–80

(1998)).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 116.
146. Id. (citing L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711

(1978)).
147. Id. (citing Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir.

2017)).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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test “the trait is the control, sex is the independent variable, and employee treatment is the dependent variable.”151
The court then provided an example of the application of this test.152 In
City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power v. Manhart,153 the Supreme Court analyzed whether the Department of Water and Power’s practice
of requiring female employees to make larger pension contributions was discriminatory.154 In doing so, the Supreme Court looked at “whether the evidence shows ‘treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person’s sex
would be different.’”155 The Second Circuit noted that life expectancy is a sexdependent trait because when an individual’s sex is changed that person’s life
expectancy also changes.156 As a result, the Supreme Court determined that
the pension system was merely a proxy for sex discrimination.157 The Zarda
court, conducting a similar analysis, explained that “a woman who is subject
to an adverse employment action because she is attracted to women would have
been treated differently if she had been a man who was attracted to women.”158
As such, discrimination based on sexual orientation is a function of sex and a
subset of sex discrimination.159
Next, the Second Circuit performed a gender stereotyping analysis. 160
The Supreme Court has determined that employment decisions cannot be based
on typical impressions about males and females.161 For example, “adverse employment actions taken based on the belief that a female [employee] should
walk, talk, and dress femininely constitute[s] impermissible sex discrimination.”162 To determine if something is a gender stereotype, the court looked to
whether an individual would have been treated differently had he or she been
a member of a different sex.163 The court concluded that “when . . . ‘an employer . . . acts on the basis of a belief that [men] cannot be [attracted to men],
or that [they] must not be,’ but takes no such action against women who are
attracted to men, the employer ‘has acted on the basis of gender.’”164

Id. at 116–17.
Id. at 117.
L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
Id. at 704–05.
Id. at 711 (internal citations omitted).
Zarda, 883 F.3d at 117.
Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711.
Zarda, 883 F.3d at 119.
Id.
Id.
Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707.
Zarda, 883 F.3d at 119 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
250–52 (1989)).
163. Id. at 120 (citing Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d
107, 120 n.10 (2d Cir. 2004)).
164. Id. at 120–21 (en banc) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
250 (1989)) (alterations in the original).
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
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In support of this notion, the Second Circuit noted that courts have previously attempted to draw lines between gender stereotypes that create valid
claims of sex discrimination and those that constitute discrimination based on
sexual orientation.165 The court determined that a line need not be drawn because sexual orientation discrimination is rooted in gender stereotypes.166 In
response, the government argued that even if sexual orientation discrimination
is based on gender stereotypes, it is not unlawful because men and women are
treated the same.167 The court rejected this argument, stating that “an employer
who discriminates against employees based on assumptions about the gender
to which the employees can or should be attracted has engaged in sex-discrimination irrespective of whether the employer uses a double-edged sword that
cuts both men and women.”168 Consistent with Hively, the Second Circuit determined associational discrimination reinforces that sexual orientation discrimination is a subset of sex discrimination.169 Yet, the majority did not express an opinion on whether an exception might be appropriate for “discriminatory conduct rooted in religious beliefs.”170
While Hively and Zarda analyzed Title VII, the Seventh Circuit extended
Hively’s rationale to the FHA in Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Community.171 In that case, Wetzel moved to St. Andrew, a living community for older
adults.172 Wetzel spoke to the staff, as well as other residents, about her sexual
orientation, but she was met with animosity, including verbal and physical
abuse, from other residents.173 The various incidents were reported, but St.
Andrew did nothing to help Wetzel.174 In fact, St. Andrew responded by retaliating against Wetzel.175 For example, St. Andrew substantially barred Wetzel
from the lobby, halted her cleaning services, and moved her to a less optimal
dining area.176 Eventually, Wetzel sued under the FHA, alleging that St. Andrew did not provide a non-discriminatory living environment and that she was
retaliated against for complaining about the harassment.177 In deciding whether

165. Id. at 124 (citing Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 830 F.3d 698, 705–
09 (7th Cir. 2017)), vacated by 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
166. Id. at 122.
167. Id. at 123.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 124.
170. Id. at 122, n.22.
171. Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, 901 F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir.
2018), cert. dismissed 139 S. Ct. 1249 (2019) (mem).
172. Id. at 859.
173. Id. at 860.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 861.
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sexual orientation discrimination constituted discrimination based on sex, the
Seventh Circuit stated that Hively applied with equal force under the FHA.178
Despite these recent decisions the Eastern District of Missouri, in Walsh,
was bound by Eighth Circuit precedent, which has not been revisited and
clearly states that sexual orientation is not a protected characteristic.179

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Walsh, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted Friendship Village’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because sexual orientation is not a protected class under Eighth Circuit precedent.180 The court first explained that the FHA covers multiple classes but does
not explicitly protect sexual orientation.181 The court then addressed the claim
that Walsh and Nance were treated less favorably because of their sex.182 The
Eastern District noted Walsh and Nance did not adduce any evidence showing
that men in a same-sex relationship would have been admitted to Friendship
Village.183 As a result, the court determined the claims were truly based on
sexual orientation, not just sex,184 and the Eighth Circuit has “held that ‘Title
VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals.’”185 Additionally,
the court referenced other decisions that have determined sexual orientation is
not protected by the FHA.186 The Eastern District, however, acknowledged
that other courts have recently held that discrimination based on sexual orientation is in fact a form of sex discrimination.187 Yet, because the court was
bound by Eighth Circuit precedent, the claim was denied.188
Next, the court considered the claim that Walsh and Nance were treated
less favorably due to their association with a person of a particular sex.189
Walsh and Nance specifically argued that if one of them were a man, they

178. Id. at 862.
179. Walsh v. Friendship Vill. of S. Cty., 352 F. Supp. 3d 920, 926 (E.D. Mo. 2019),

appeal docketed, No. 19-1395 (8th Cir. Feb. 27, 2019) (citing Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989)).
180. Id. at 925–27.
181. Id. at 925.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 925–26.
185. Id. at 926 (quoting Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70
(8th Cir. 1989)).
186. Id. (citing Fair Housing Ctr. of Washtenaw Cty., Inc. v. Town and Country
Apartments, No. 07–10262, 2009 WL 497402, at *7 n.1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2009)).
187. Id. (citing Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 113 (2d Cir. 2018)
(en banc)).
188. Id.
189. Id.
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would not have been denied housing.190 Thus, but for their sex, Friendship
Village’s decision would have been different.191 The court agreed that associational discrimination claims are sometimes valid but denied Walsh and
Nance’s assertion because they did not show that these claims are actionable
when the class at issue is not statutorily protected.192
Finally, the court turned to the sex stereotyping claim.193 Courts have
allowed gender stereotyping claims under Title VII when such stereotyping
impacts employment decisions.194 Yet, these claims are rejected when they are
used as a proxy for sexual orientation discrimination claims.195 Courts usually
try “to distinguish between discrimination based on stereotypical notions of
femininity and masculinity and that based on sexual orientation, determining
the former is actionable under Title VII while the latter is not.”196 Here, the
court determined that this claim need not be addressed because the stereotyping
was based only on sexual orientation – an unprotected class – and thus, the
claim could not stand.197
For the above reasons, the Eastern District granted Friendship Village’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Walsh and Nance’s
amended complaint.198 In February 2019, Walsh and Nance filed an appeal to
the Eighth Circuit.199

V. COMMENT
While early decisions determined sexual orientation is not a protected
class under federal statutes, courts are now reaching different results. Two
federal circuits have changed their position, and other circuits continue to face
this issue. This Part will examine the close relationship between discrimination
based on sex and discrimination based on sexual orientation by looking to Supreme Court precedent, as well as the plain language of Title VII and the FHA.
Ultimately, this Part argues that discrimination based on sexual orientation is a
subset of sex discrimination.

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Id. at 926–27.
Id. at 927.
Id.
Id. (quoting Hunter v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 697 F.3d 697, 702 (8th Cir.

2012)).
195. Id. (citing Pambianchi v. Ark. Tech Univ., No. 4:13-CV-00046-KGB, 2014
WL 11498236, at *5 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 14, 2014)).
196. Id. (quoting Pambianchi, 2014 WL 11498236, at *5).
197. Id. at 927–28.
198. Id. at 928.
199. Id. The appeal will be held in abeyance until the Supreme Court issues a decision in Zarda and Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia.
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A. Supreme Court Precedent
The inclusion of sexual orientation discrimination as a subset of sex discrimination is reasonable when considered in light of Supreme Court precedent. Treating individuals differently based on traits not explicitly protected in
statutes can constitute unlawful discrimination if those traits are a proxy for, or
a function of, a protected characteristic. For example, the Supreme Court has
determined that treating individuals differently based on life expectancy constitutes unlawful sex discrimination.200 In Manhart, the defendant required females to make larger pension contributions than men because, on average,
women live longer.201 Life expectancy is a sex-dependent trait, so altering an
individual’s sex would change life expectancy, and consequently, the application of the pension policy.202 Because life expectancy is a function of sex, the
pension policy treated employees differently due to their sex, which is prohibited by the statute.
In terms of sexual orientation, changing an individual’s sex leads to different treatment. The Second Circuit has explained that a “but for” test is used
to determine whether a given trait serves as a proxy for, or a function of, sex.203
In Hively, the plaintiff was a lesbian, but had she been a male, she would have
been heterosexual.204 If this were the case, Hively would not have been denied
her promotion.205 Just as changing an individual’s sex necessarily alters an
individual’s life expectancy, changing an individual’s sex necessarily alters
that person’s sexual orientation. In other words, sexual orientation is, in part,
dependent on an individual’s sex. Thus, when individuals are treated differently based on their sexual orientation, they are treated differently, in part, because of sex.
Gender stereotyping jurisprudence further supports the notion that sex
discrimination encompasses sexual orientation discrimination. Individuals
cannot be treated adversely based on a failure to comply with generalizations
about their gender.206 Gay individuals “represent[] the ultimate . . . failure to
conform to [gender] stereotype[s] (at least as understood in a place such as
modern America, which views heterosexuality as the norm and other forms of
sexuality as exceptional): [they are] not heterosexual.”207 Some argue that heterosexuality is not a sex-specific stereotype but rather an insistence that individuals match the typical sexual orientation irrespective of sex.208 Yet, this

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978).
Id. at 704–05.
Id. at 711.
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 116 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc).
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017)).
Id. at 345.
Zarda, 883 F.3d at 120.
Hively, 853 F.3d at 346.
Id. at 370 (Sykes, J. dissenting).
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view is too wide. Sex-specific stereotypes emerge when a preference for heterosexuality is applied on an individual level. For example, asking a male to
conform to the usual sexual orientation requires that man to marry a woman.
The reverse would be true for a woman that is asked to conform to the standard
sexual orientation. So, at a general level, requiring heterosexuality does not
create stereotypes specific to males or females, but, on the individual level,
people are treated adversely due to their failure to conform with a quintessential
gender stereotype – that males should be attracted to females and vice versa.
Finally, some maintain that this form of sex stereotyping is not prohibited because men and women are treated the same.209 Yet, two wrongs do not make
a right, and impermissible discrimination has occurred even if “a double-edged
sword” was used to cut both men and women.210
Associational discrimination provides another basis for determining that
sexual orientation is protected under the “because of” sex language. This type
of discrimination was first recognized in the context of miscegenation statutes.211 In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court determined that a Virginia
law criminalizing interracial marriages was impermissibly based on race and
therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause.212 While Loving was decided
on constitutional grounds, courts have held that constitutional determinations
can provide guidance in the statutory context.213 In fact, circuit courts have
extended this rationale to statutes and determined that if an action is taken
against a person due to their association with another race, then that person has
been discriminated against based on his or her own race.214 Associational discrimination has a similar application to sexual orientation. A person’s sexual
orientation depends not only on the sex of the individual but also on the sex of
one’s partner. Consequently, discrimination based on sexual orientation is, in
part, based on an individual’s association with a member of the same sex, and
adverse treatment due to this association constitutes discrimination based on
that individual’s own sex. Some argue the rationale of cases addressing race
discrimination should not be extended to this context because of differences in
these types of discrimination.215 However, the text of both Title VII and the
Zarda, 883 F.3d at 123.
Id.
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2, 12 (1967).
Id. at 12.
See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 582 (2009).
Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir.
1986) (“Where a plaintiff claims discrimination based upon an interracial marriage or
association, he alleges, by definition, that he has been discriminated against because of
his race.”) (emphasis added); Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2nd Cir. 2008)
(“[W]here an employee is subjected to adverse action because an employer disapproves
of interracial association, the employee suffers discrimination because of the employee’s own race.”) (emphasis added); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853
F.3d 339, 348 (7th Cir. 2017) (adopting the analysis used in Holcomb).
215. Hively, 853 F.3d at 368 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
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FHA do not draw a distinction between discrimination based on race and discrimination based on sex.216

B. Statutory Interpretation
The plain language of the statute further reinforces that discrimination
based on sexual orientation is, in part, a function of an individual’s sex. Title
VII and the FHA prohibit discrimination “because of” sex.217 Sexual orientation meets this test because discrimination based on someone’s sexual orientation is partially predicated on an individual’s sex. Black’s Law Dictionary defines sexual orientation as “‘[a] person’s predisposition or inclination toward
sexual activity or behavior with other males or females’ and is commonly categorized as ‘heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.’”218 Additionally,
Merriam Webster defines gay as “of, relating to, or characterized by a tendency
to direct sexual desire toward another of the same sex.”219 Consequently, sexual orientation is predicated on both the sex of the individual and the sex of
those to whom he or she is attracted. As the majority in Zarda explained, one
cannot fully define sexual orientation without identifying an individual’s sex,
and, as such, sex plays a role in sexual orientation discrimination.220
Some argue that, to the average person, sex is distinct from sexual orientation.221 While this is true to an extent, sex still plays a role in the average
person’s perception of sexual orientation. Individuals invariably consider the
sex of a person, as well as the sex of that person’s partner, when determining a
person’s sexual orientation. Even though these two traits are distinct, there is
an overlap because determining whether one is gay must be based, in part, on
that person’s sex. The connection can be shown by the applying the “but for”
test utilized in Zarda.222 For example, if a woman is in a romantic relationship
with another woman, she is a lesbian, while a man in a relationship with a
woman is heterosexual.223 In short, sex and sexual orientation are connected
because changing one’s sex also alters that person’s sexual orientation.224
Even though the plain language of both Title VII and the FHA fairly encompass sexual orientation discrimination, legislative intent poses an issue. Of
course, inquiry into legislative intent is unnecessary when a statute is plain on

42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018).
§ 3604(a); § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Sexual Orientation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Gay, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (last visited Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/gay [perma.cc/YVL7-S9V4].
220. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 113 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc).
221. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 362 (7th Cir. 2017)
(Sykes, J., dissenting).
222. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 116.
223. Id.
224. Id.
216.
217.
218.
219.
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its face.225 Further, “the text is the lodestar of statutory interpretation.”226
Courts defer to the text of statutes, rather than legislative intent, for various
reasons. First, courts are tasked with giving effect to the broad language of a
statute.227 The Supreme Court has explained that statutes “often go beyond the
principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by
which we are governed.”228 Second, legislative intent can be unreliable.229
Records might be poorly kept, and there are often multiple explanations for
why a law did not pass. For example, unpopular amendments might be attached to a bill or lobbying might influence the legislative process. Additionally, members of Congress might not propose laws in the first instance because
they believe other issues are more pressing. The complications worsen when
one attempts to understand why Congress has neglected to amend existing
law.230 Perhaps Congress is content with the law as written, pleased with how
courts have interpreted the statute, or gridlock prevents further legislation, regardless of the merits of the proposed change.231
The above concerns regarding legislative history, however, do not apply
with similar force in this context. Congressional intent can be safely intuited
based on the circumstances that existed when these laws were passed. In 1964,
“homosexuality” was a crime, and gay people were believed to suffer from
mental illness.232 In fact, the American Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological Association classified “homosexuality” as a mental disorder until 1973 and 1975, respectively.233 Based on these facts, sexual orientation discrimination does not appear to be a “reasonably comparable evil.”234
Congress surely was not concerned with discrimination based on sexual orientation when Title VII and the FHA were passed, given the prevailing attitude
towards gay individuals at that time. Thus, even if plain language favors including sexual orientation as a protected characteristic, this interpretation is
controversial. As the Seventh Circuit explained in Hively, the results of statutory interpretation are harder to accept when the language leads to unintended
consequences,235 such as extending protection beyond legislative intent.

225. Hively, 853 F.3d at 343.
226. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 115 (citing Onacle v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 573

U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998)).
227. Id.
228. Onacle, 573 U.S. at 79–80.
229. Hively, 853 F.3d at 343.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 343–44.
232. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 140 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc)
(Lynch, J., dissenting).
233. Id. (Lynch, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 142 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
235. Hively, 853 F.3d at 343.
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A further concern is that an interpretation expanding the scope of discrimination because of sex threatens the balance of power in the government. The
court is directly contravening legislative intent, at least from the time of the
law’s enactment. Congress, as a representative of the public, is tasked with
creating law, and the judiciary serves to interpret the law. Here, courts are
overriding Congress and creating new law. Thus, some argue that decisions
involving the expansion of legislation should be left to our legislators.236
Yet, there is importance in law being workable. Over time, society progresses and public opinion changes. As a result, giving new meaning to statutes
can be justified. As Judge Posner explained in his Hively concurrence:
This is something courts do fairly frequently to avoid statutory obsolescence and concomitantly to avoid placing the entire burden of updating
old statutes on the legislative branch. We should not leave the impression that we are merely the obedient servants of the 88th Congress
(1963–1965), carrying out their wishes. We are not. We are taking
advantage of what the last half century has taught.237

While this view is often endorsed in constitutional jurisprudence,238
courts have used statutory interpretation to give legislation a new meaning, one
that comports with modern public opinion.239 For example, the Sherman Antitrust Act was passed in 1890, but courts interpret that law in light of modern
economics.240 Judicial interpretation has been used to update the Sherman Act,
and this practice ensures that “old law satisf[ies] modern needs and understandings.”241 Title VII and the FHA were passed in 1964 and 1968, respectively.242
Much has changed in the fifty years since then – the fundamental right of marriage has been constitutionally guaranteed to same-sex couples,243 and a majority of Americans now support same-sex marriage.244 Courts should “tak[e]
advantage of what the last half century has taught,” rather than applying the
congressional intent of 1964 and 1968, which is now antiquated and disconnected from modern sentiments.

See id. at 372 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
See id. at 357 (Posner, J., concurring).
Id. at 353–54.
Id. at 352.
Id.
Id.
1964, supra note 30 (discussing the history of the 1964 Act, which includes
Title VII); History of Fair Housing, supra note 35 (discussing the history of the FHA).
243. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015).
244. Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage: Public Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage,
PEW RES. CTR. (May 14, 2019), https://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/ [perma.cc/XRU3-9KHC] (finding that, based on a 2019 survey, 61% of Americans support same-sex marriage while 31% are opposed).
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
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The notion that discrimination based on sexual orientation is a type of
unlawful sex discrimination is supported by Supreme Court precedent, as well
as the plain language of Title VII and the FHA. Although, as courts continue
to alter their interpretation of federal statutes, additional issues will arise. For
example, the plaintiffs in Walsh were denied housing based on a policy informed by religious beliefs.245 In both Hively and Zarda, however, the courts
did not address how religious motivations might impact this new interpretation.246 As individuals continue to allege discrimination based on sexual orientation, courts will be forced to resolve these complex issues.

VI. CONCLUSION
Both Supreme Court precedent and the plain language of federal antidiscrimination statutes indicate that discrimination based on sexual orientation is
a subset of unlawful sex discrimination. Yet, there are viable arguments on
both sides, and the federal circuits remain split on this issue. As courts continue
to alter their interpretation of federal statutes, additional complications will
likely appear. Despite these potential issues, gay people deserve to be treated
with “equal dignity in the eyes of the law,”247 and federal statutes, as well as
the judiciary, should reinforce that notion.

245. Walsh v. Friendship Vill. of South Cty., 352 F. Supp. 3d 920, 923 (E.D. Mo.
2019), docketed, No. 19-1395 (8th Cir. Feb. 27, 2019).
246. Hively, 853 F.3d at 352; Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 122
n.22 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc).
247. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
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